عــدم جــواز الاعـتــذار بالــجــهــل بالـقـانــون في الــمسـائــل الـمـدنــيــة ( دراســـة مــقـــارنــــة )

‎ Ignorance of the law is not accepted as an excuse in civil matters ( A Comparative Study(

Abstract

The principle of ignorance of the law as not an excuse means that the argument of the lack of knowledge of the provisions of the law was not accepted, because the law is enforceable against everyone, whether they knew it or not.
The issue of ignorance of the law is no excuse considered one of the important topics for the individual and society in general. As such importance is evident in the fact that the law is a regulator of the behavior of individuals and their relations to achieve justice and equality between persons and to achieve legal stability in society. Because ignorance of the law exposes society to chaos and leads to the loss of the rights of individuals. In addition, the importance of such a principle appears from a legal view in terms of the burden of proof and applying the provisions of the law to everyone and not hearing their claim of ignorance of it, as the law obliges everyone to know its provisions.
Regarding the practical aspect, it emerges by addressing the solution to the problems facing the judiciary in the practice of applying the law by adhering to this rule. Perhaps the purpose for studying this topic is the lack of studies related to it, as we did not find an independent article or study addressing the topic of the ignorance of the law is not accepted as an excuse in civil matters in detail, but there are researches that deal with a specific part such as the exceptions contained therein within the scope of the general law. The study also aims to clarify the position of the Iraqi legislator regarding the principle of the inadmissibility of apology for ignorance of the law, whether it is stipulated in the civil law or not compared to other legislations.
The problem of the study is represented in the question: Is ignorance of the law no excuse a general text applicable to all public and private laws, especially civil law? Does its scope apply to all those addressed by the provisions of the law, or can a person invoke his ignorance in certain cases? Showing when is it appropriate for ignorance to be justified and legitimate to be excused, and what are its ranks? What is the origin of the rule of inadmissibility of ignorance of the law? Is it a legal rule, a principle, or a legal presumption? Does ignorance of the law have an effect in terms of whether civil liability is established and in terms of the judgment for compensation?
In order to answer these questions, the legal regulation of the inadmissibility of apology for ignorance of the law requires dividing the thesis into two chapters: In the first chapter, we will explain the concept that ignorance of the law is no excuse, in terms of the legal concepts and the legal justifications, clarifying the legal basis and scope of its application, and an indication of the levels of ignorance, and distinguishing it from other similar legal forms.
The second chapter was devoted to explaining the provisions of the rule of the ignorance of the law is no excuse by explaining the impact of this principle, in terms of the establishment of civil liability and compensation.
The analytical and comparative approach was adopted between the Iraqi Civil Law No. (40) of 1951, the Egyptian Civil Law No. (131) of 1948, the Syrian Civil Law No. (84) of 1949, and some other laws related, such as the publication law and the law of evidence in Iraq, Egypt, and Syria.